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INTRODUCTION
The shortcomings of compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes have
been apparent to many observers of labor problems for many years. Labor
and management have usually looked upon compulsory arbitration with much
distrust and hostility. The use of labor courts usually means the compul-
sory submission of labor disputes to a special court for settlement, thus
placing such conflicts in the same category with conunercial disputes.
Compulsory labor arbitration can be of two types, the interpretation of an
existing contract or the writing of a new agreement when the parties are
unable to agree to a new contract. In this paper we shall be concerned
with the latter.
States have from time to time attempted to create industrial courts to
arbitrate labor and management differences. These attempts have usually had
little success in achieving industrial harmony and tranquility. The most
notable example of such an experiment was made by the state of Kansas in
1920 following the serious nation-wide coal strike of 1919. This was indeed
a bold attempt to substitute compulsory arbitration for industrial combat to
thwart subsequent public harm and discomfort which may occur as a result of
work stoppages in certain fields.
The purpose of this study is to review the history and experiences
of the Kansas Industrial Relations Act and to explore the limits within
which the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes may be constitutionally
applied in a democracy. It is the objective of this paper to point out
some of the pitfalls of compulsory arbitration in settling labor-management
conflicts.
The author has made use of the personal documents and letters of the
leading figures who were involved in the enactment of the Kansas law and who
participated in the Court's work. These files are located in the Kansas
Historical Society and in the office of the state Labor Commissioner. The
leading court cases which tested the Act's constitutionality have been
reviewed and analyzed. The author has interviewed many people who partici-
pated in the Kansas experiment. _;
_
^_
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KANSAS INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT '
'
Tht first idea for a court of industrial relations in Kansas came from
a self«made lawyer, William L. Huggins of Emporia, Kansas. This gentleman
was first attracted to the need for the "legal adjustment of industrial
controversies" during the Pullman and Railway strike of 1894, Several of
his friends were union railway workers and were involved in this strike.
Some of these friends were not in favor of striking. But they felt that
they had to go along with the rest of the workers in walking out and strik-
ing or else they would lose their union standing and be ostracized by the
union wherever they would seek employment. The union lost the strike and
many of the strikers lost their jobs. Some of Huggins' friends who were
2
strikers were "blacklisted" by the victorious railroads.
Signed but undated letter to the secretary of the Kansas Historical
Society from William L. Huggins (in the Archives of the Kansas Historical
Society, Topeka, Kansas).
2
William L. Huggins, Labor and Democracy (New York: the Macmillan
Company, 1922), p. 1.
i'TV »"'• ' fr**
Need for Compulsory Arbitration of Industrial Disputes
Mr. Muggins, a law student and principal of a ward school in the city
of Emporia, Kansas, was deeply impressed by the stateinent of Blackstone,
"that the genius of cooBion law was such that it offered a remedy for every
wrong against person or property." However, this remedy was not available
for these men who had first been compelled to strike against their own will
and then were blacklisted by the railroads as a result of their participa-
tion in the strike. Muggins could not see how these men could receive
justice. Me stated that there was a "lapse of law" here in that there was
3
no judicial tribunal open to them in which they could air their complaints.
Shortly thereafter the Debs case was decided. Muggins was impressed
by Justice Brewer's statement in deciding this case "that Congress had the
pow*r to outlaw strikes that interfered with interstate conmerce and
4
carriage of the mails." Muggins thought that the law could mete out
justice and that the answer to the problem of labor and industrial disputes
was the creation of an industrial relations court which would have the power
to adjudicate disputes between labor, capital, and the public.
In 1911, a bill was passed by the state legislature of Kansas providing
for the regulation of public utilities. Muggins studied this bill and
supported it in its entirety. He was enthusiastic about the possibility of
^ Ibid ., p. 3.
4
In Re Debs
. Petitioner . 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
Doroenico Gagliardo, The Kansas Industrial Court (Lawrence, Kansas
t
University of Kansas Publications, 194l)
,
p. 30.
it being the basis of a law that would regulate corporations dealing with
public services. He stated that public opinion and court rulings had made
a complete circuit going from the theory of laissez-faire back to the view
reached by Sir Matthew Hale almost 250 years previous, namely, the belief in
7
public regulation and control of industry.
.::, ^kjggins reasoned that the "capital side" could be controlled. The
statwnent of Justice Brewer's in the Debs case had showed that the state
could use its police power to prevent interference which stopped or retarded
interstate commerce. The state, Huggins inferred, could stop the same in
intrastate commerce. But the question "could labor still be protected and
given justice with the right of the strike removed?" still remained in
Muggins* mind.
, „
It apoeared to Huggins that this problem of justice to labor was solved
with the case of Wilson v. New in 1916. The decision in this case upheld
the emergency Adamson Act. The United States Supreme Court decided that
Congress did have the power to avert "a great emergency and protect the
public from the evils of a great strike" by regulating the hours of work
Q
for laborers engaged in interstate commerce. The opinion handed down in
this case appeared to convince Huggins that it was possible and feasible to
adjudicate industrial disputes. The United States Supreme Court's decision
nay also explain why the Kansas Industrial Relations Act of 1920 applied
William I. Huggins, "Essays on the Public Utilities Commission,'
(Archives of the Kansas Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas).
7
Letter of William L. Huggins to the secretary of the Kansas
Historical Society.
® Wilson V. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
only to industries that were affected with a public interest and only to
controversies involved therein which endangered the public health, peace,
9
and general welfare.
During the years of 1918 and 1919 Huggins, while serving on the Kansas
Public Utilities Ccanroission, expounded his views on arbitration and its role
In resolving industrial disputes. He appeared before numerous public
audiences, including the 1919 International Rotary Convention. In October
of 1919, Huggins, influenced by unrest in the Southeast Kansas coal fields,
outlined clearly and precisely the basic framework and principles which an
industrial relations law should include. •
Huggins had studied the New Zealand, Australian, and British arbitra-
tion laws. The Kansas law was to be a complete departure from all previous
arbitration laws. It was to be an adjudication court, not an arbitration
court. Disputes were to be adjusted, rather than determined or fixed at
the discretion of an arbitrater. Huggins had the full support of Governor
Allen and had aroused the interest of many prominent Kansas lawyers and
legislators. However, their opinions of the law were mixed and divided and
gave Huggins little help in making any revisions to his original draft.
9
Huggins, Labor and Democracy
, p. 34.
William I.. Huggins, "Is There a Labor Problem?" (Topeka, Kansas
t
State Printing Plant), (no date).
Herbert Feis, "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, Its
Spokesmen, Its Record," Quarterly Journal of Economics , XXXVII (August
1923), p. 707.
Coal Strike of 1919
During the First World War, Kansas had been relatively free of «ny
major strikes; nevertheless, there had occurred during this period numerous
12
strikes of a short and irritating nature. In November of 1919 the
bituminous coal miners of Southeastern Kansas, organized under the aggres-
sive and "invincible" leadership of Alexander Howat, and the United Mine
Workers of America suddenly made demands upon the United States Fuel
Administration. The union had little success with its demands and set a
strike for November 1, 1919. To combat this emergency, the Federal govern-
ment intervened and declared that the war was not really over and that the
strike was therefore illegal under the Lever Act. The President asked the
Attorney-General to apply for an injunction to stay the strike. An injunc-
tion was immediately given by a Federal judge in Indiana halting the work
stoppage. John L. Lewis, the national president of the mine workers,
canceled the strike order. After conferring with other union officials, he
said that they had no desire to fight the United States government. But
the cancellation order of Lewis and the national union was almost completely
13
disobeyed by the rank and file miners.
In Kansas, Howat ordered all mine operations to be completely
suspended. Kansas, taken by surprise, was inflamed and incensed with th«
12
Henry J. Allen, The Party of the Third Part (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1921), p. 49.
13
Selig Perlman and Phillip Taft, History of Labor in the United
States . 1896-193? (New York: the Wacmillan Company, 1935), pp. 469-473.
^^ Ibid ., pp. 473-476.
insurgent Kansas coal miners' strike. The State of Kansas intervened. The
Governor of Kansas attempted to use his personal influence by urging both
the mine operators and the union to negotiate under his direction. The mine
owners were willing to negotiate a separate contract apart from the national
negotiations, but Howat and the local unions refused. Numerous injunctions
15
were brought by the Federal goverranent, but they were to no avail. Howat
and his men continued their work stoppage. Howat was quoted as saying that
"regardless of all injunctions, prisons, and judges" he would not alter his
stand concerning the work stoppage. Nevertheless, it was still hoped that
the Federal government could compel Howat to call off his strike.
Realizing that conditions were slowly deteriorating and that the
emergency was far from over, the Governor began to consider what action the
state could take to alleviate the growing problem and to protect the public
welfare. The possibility of the state taking over the mines and operating
them was considered. The Governor conferred with the Attorney-General.
They decided to pray for a court injunction which would put the struck coal
17
mines into state receivership. The injunction was granted on the grounds
that "a conspiracy or canbination to cease production in violation of the
18
state anti-trust laws existed."
Armed with this order to put the coal mines into receivership, the
15
Allen, og. cit., pp. 50-55.
Topeka Daily Capital . November 9, 1919.
17 -/A-'-
Gagliardo, og. cit., pp. 17-19.
18
State of Kansas v. Mallams-Halstead Coal Company . Number 22,700,
(application for receivership)
.
state, on November 17, 1919, took control of mines that produced about
ninety-five per cent of the state's coal output. The Governor again pleaded
with the miners to go back to work. He offered them their previous wages
and agreed to make retroactive to this time any wage increase that would
come from further national contract negotiations. Howat and his miners
refused and added that the union miners would work only if the demands by
19
the national union were conceded to them.
Finally, Governor Allen, realizing the futility of further attempts to
immediately settle the strike, decided to call for volunteers to work in the
mines. Eighteen hundred troops were dispatched to the scene to protect the
enthusiastic volunteers composed of college students, farmers, and local
unemployed laborers. The mine operations began on December 1, 1919 under
extremely harsh and unfavorable conditions. The volunteers had little
experience in mining and mining techniques. Many had never seen the inside
of a mine. Therefore, operations were confined to the strip or open mines.
The Governor's office cleared the orders for the needed coal and distributed
it through the local governments. The coal that was mined was of poor
quality and many complaints were made to the state officials.
The operations were short-lived. A temporary settlement was made with
the union. On December 11th and 12th Governor Allen met with union and mine
officials and signed an agreement which was to last for sixty days. The
contract gave the workers a fourteen per cent increase in wages and further
Debate between Samuel Gompers and Henry J. Allen (New Yorkj E. P*
Dutton and Company, 1920)
,
p. 18.
20
Gagliardo, 0£. clt
. ,
pp. 20-22.
provided that the award of the national negotiations would be binding on
11 *. 21all parties.
Enactment of Compulsory Arbitration
After having finally succeeded in getting coal operations resumed,
Governor Allen called a special session of the legislature to convene on
January 5, 1920. Allen decided that Kansas should enact a labor relations
law regulating labor disputes in certain industries. These industries were
the mining or production of fuel; the manufacture of clothing; the manufac-
turing or preparing of food products; the transportation of fuel, clothing,
22
and food; and the operation of public utilities and common carriers.
The controversy surrounding governmental regulations of industrial
disputes became very intense end serious. Much debate followed concerning
the rights of labor, capital, and above all, the rights and welfare of the
public. Representatives of labor and capital were very critical of any
attempts on the part of the state to interfere with their actions and rights
•
Labor's arguments were presented chiefly by Frank P. Walsh, Chairman of
the United States Commission on Industrial Relations and a strong friend of
labor. He contended that the Kansas bill contained all of the vices and
23
none of the virtues of comjfMilsory arbitration. Unions, he felt, would
^^ Ibid ., pp. 22-23.
22
Allen, op. cit., p. 212.
23
William M. Duffus, "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations,"
American Economic Review
.
X (March, 1920), pp. 407-412,
10
<;lowly die off with extreme state regulation and the whole process of
collective bargaining would become a farce. He also stated that such a law
would be declared unconstitutional because it would be unreasonably dis-
criminatory. The law would cover only certain industries which were
essential to the public welfare. Walsh maintained that all industries were
24
essential to the public.
Colonel John S. Dean represented the employers* drive against having
the state enter into industrial conflicts. He based his arguments on the
fact that such a law would tend to be confiscatory and that it would also
25
lean toward the involuntary servitude of labor.
William L. !-luggins and Governor Allen presented to the legislature the
public's point of view on the proposed measure. However, most of the
legislators had already made the decision that some type of industrial
relations court was necessary even before the special session had been
called due to the publicity which the controversy had received.
With William L. Muggins' guidance and Governor Allen's support, the
Kansas Industrial Relations Act of 1920 was put into a final draft. The
Senate and the House made relatively few changes in it. In the House, the
vote was 104 in favor with seven against it, and in the Senate thert were
33 votes for it and five against it. The bill was imniediately signed by the
27Governor on January 23 and it became effective on January 24, 1920.
24
Gagliardo, og. cit .
. p. 37.
^^ Ibid ., pp. 38-39.
9ft
Allen, 02. cit .. pp. 79-91.
27
Gagliardo, 0£, cit ., pp. 46-49.
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We can see from the chain of events leading up to the enactment of this
law that the Kansas Industrial Relations A;:t of 1920 was not a piece of
hasty legislation. Its evolvement came about because many people had given
serious consideration to such a law and because of the serious coal strike
of 1919.
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE KANSAS LAW
The original Kansas Industrial Relations Act of 1920 was composed of
thirty separate sections. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze
all of the sections of the l3w. This paper is limited to the major
provisions of the law. . • -,„.;
The Act created a tribunal of three persons to be appointed by the
Governor for terms of three years. One member's term was to expire each
year. No specific qualifications were required for those serving as judges.
28
The salary for each judge was set at $5,000 per year.
The Industrial Court had all the powers of higher courts and was given
wide powers of investigation into industrial problems and conditions. The
law provided that the Industrial Court must be given free access to all
papers and books belonging to the parties involved in an industrial dispute.
However, the tribunal did not have the direct power of issuing subpoenas
and injunctions. It had to apply for these through the regular court
channels. This aspect of the court lessened to a great extent the
Industrial Court's ability to function properly and expediently in cases
28
Kansas, Laws of Special Gossion, 1920 . Chapter 29, Section 1.
12
29
that demanded Intmediate attention and correction.
The most important section of the Act was section 3a. This section
declared that certain industries and utilities affected the public interest
and were "therefore subject to supervision by the state" for the purpose of
"preserving the public peace, protecting the public health, preventing
industrial strife, disorder, and waste, and securing regular and orderly
conduct of all businesses directly affecting the living conditions of the
30
people of the state and in promotion of the public welfare." The specific
industries were: the manufacture or preparation of food products; the
manufacture of clothing; the mining or production of fuel; the transporta-
tion of food, clothing, and fuel; and all public utilities.
The Kansas legislature added to the list of industries formerly regarded
as affected with a public interest at least three others. These were the
manufacture of food, the manufacture of clothing, and the mining or produc-
tion of fuel. In fact, it was stated during the hearings on the bill that
these three items, clothing, food, and fuel, were the three prime neces«
sities of every civilized people and that they were in fact clothed with
more of a public interest than transportation facilities and public
...... 31
utilities.
The law stated that the named industries and utilities must "be
operated with reasonable continuity and efficiency." Reasonable continuity
and efficiency was to allow for seasonal fluctuations that might occur. The
29 Gagliardo, 0£. cit. , pp. 48-49.
30
Kansas, loc . cit .. Chapter 29, Section 3.
31
Muggins, Labor and Democracy
, p. 53.
13
law further declared that "any willful attempt to hinder, limit, or suspend
such continuous and efficient operations for the single purpose of evading
the intent and original purpose of this Act" was unlawful and punishable by
32
the Industrial Court.
Any willful violation of this Act or of an order of the Industrial
Court was made a misdemeanor and punishable by a maximum fine of $1,000 or
a prison term not to exceed one year, or both. If the willful violator was
an officer of a labor organization or an employer, the violation was termed
a felony and punishable by a maximum fine of $5,000 or a prison term of not
33
more than two years, or both.
The Industrial Court was obligated to hear controversies In the named
industries and utilities upon a complaint from labor or management. In
addition, any ten citizen taxpayers of a community had the right to petition
to the Industrial Court. The Attorney-General was also vested with the power
to initiate complaints and the Industrial Court was required to rule on them.
The only requisite necessary for a person to be heard was that the parties
involved must be unable to agree on the issues and that such disagreements
must threaten the continuity or efficiency of service in the declared
essential industries.
The Industrial Court could intervene upon its own initiative in
industrial disputes when it appeared that such controversies would threaten
the continuity and efficiency of service to the e:ttent that it endangered
32
Kansas, loc. cit., Chapter 29, Section 6.
33
Ibid., Sections 19 and 20.
34
Muggins, og. cit., pp. 70-73.
"i;^
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the public peace or threatened the public health. The Industrial Court
rulings were binding on all parties. However, both sides did have the right
to appeal to the state Supreme Court. The right of appeal to the state
Supreme Court existed only if the appeal was made within ten days after the
Industrial Court had made its decision. If the belligerent parties would
not accept the orders of the Industrial Court, it could bring action to the
state Supreme Court to compel the parties to comply with its orders.
Th« Industrial Court was given the authority to approve, upon proper
showing, the coimnencing, limiting, or ceasing of operations in any of the
affected businesses. It was unlawful for operators in any of the covered
industries to willfully cease or limit operations for the purpose of limit-
ing transportation or production or to effect prices for the purpose of
avoiding any of the provisions of the Act. \
The Industrial Court had the emergency power to take over and operate
any of the named industries and utilities when its suspension or limitations
of operations endangered the public peace or threatened to harm the health
and welfare of the public. The emergency powers existed "for such reasonable
time" as was necessary to preserve the public health and peace.
The Act stated that in the interest of the public welfare, the workers
in the named employments should "receive fair wages" and have "healthful and
normal working surroundings," and that capital "shall have a fair return for
3c,
its use." The Industrial Court was given the power to regulate hours,
wages, and working conditions, under terms that were fair and reasonable.
Cases could be reopened after sixty days of compliance by either party. If
35
Kansas, loc . cit.. Chapter 29, Section 7.
15
the Industrial Court ordered an increase in wages, it was to be made retro-
active to the beginning of the court proceedings.
Neither party was to be assessed any court costs when the Industrial
Court acted in its behalf. The Industrial Court was soon called the "court
of the penniless man." In fact, the advocates of this law felt that the
only way justice could be had for all parties was to make the Industrial
37
Court's services free to anyone who had a valid and legitimate complaint.
Collective bargaining was still recognized. Labor associations or
unions which incorporated under the law were considered legal entities.
They could be represented before the Industrial Court by anyone of their own
choosing. Unincorporated unions had to appoint representatives in writing.
Bargaining could still continue, but if the parties in the named industries
failed to agree on the issues, then the Industrial Court was given the power
to adjudicate the differences.
The right of an individual to quit employment at any time was
recognized. However, it was declared unlawful for any employees to conspire
together to quit employment for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or
suspending operations or to intimidate others with the intent to induce them
to quit their employment or with the intention of preventing others from
accepting employment at that place of business or at any other place of
business.
The law stated that it was unlawful to discriminate against any
employee because of the testimony given by him or because of any action
Ibid .. Sections 8 and 9.
37
Huggins, og. cit., pp. 409-410,
16
taken by the Industri=)l Court. This provision was included so that any
party with a complaint would voice it. Finally, it was declared unlawful
for two or more p^srsons to conspire to injure another party by boycott,
picketing, advertising, or otherwise, because of any action taken before
38
the Industrial Court or because of any order by the Industrial Court.
The philosophy of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was based
upon the principle "that the government should have the same power to pro-
tect society against the ruthless offenses of an industrial strife as it
has always had to protect society against recognized crime. Governor
Allen stated that the law had the following objectives:
1. To make strikes, lockouts, boycotts, and blacklists
unnecessary and impossible, by giving labor as well as capital
an able and just tribunal in which to litigate all controversies.
2. To insure to the people of this state, at all times, an
adequate supply of those products which are absolutely necessary
to the life of civilized people.
3. That by stabilizing production of these necessaries we
will also, to a great extent, stabilize the price to the producer
as well as to the consumer.
4. That we will insure to labor steadier employment, at a
fairer wage, under better working conditions.
5. That we will prevent the colossal economic waste which
always attends industrial disputes.
6. That we will make the law respected, and discourage and
ultimately abolish intimidation and violence as a means for the
settlement of industrial disputes. '^'^
38
Duffus, 0£. cit., pp. 409-410.
39
Henry J. Allen, "How Kansas Broke a Strike and Would Solve the
Labor Problem," Current Opinion
. April 1920, p. 472.
40
Allen, The Party of the Third Part , pp. 213-214.
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THE COURT'S EXPERIENCES
The chief purpose of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was to
protect "the party of the third part—the public" from deprivation and undue
hardship/^ This was to be achieved by insuring to the public reasonable
continuity and efficiency of production in the declared essential industries
and utilities.
The Industrial Court had the power to prevent or settle disjwtes by
determining wages, hours, and conditions of employment; to prevent the
cessation and limiting of operations when the objective was to violate the
lawj to bring to the workers and employers the protective features of the
law; and, if necessary, to take over and temporarily operate the Industry
concerned. '
Strikes were called at times because the parties did not want to or
care to use the facilities of the Industrial Court. All of the work stop-
pages resulting from opposition to the Act occurred in the coal mining
Industry in Southeastern Kansas. These were called by Howat for the purpose
of defying the law or were protests by the miners against the action taken
by the Industrial Court against Howat for having violated the law. These
strikes were limited to a few mines with one exception and, therefore, the
production of coal was scarcely affected. In each strike, the Court was
42
not successful in forcing the mine workers to resume their work.
The most serious strikes that took piece In Kansas during this era were
^^ State v. Howat, 109 Kansas 376, 414 (1921).
42
Gagliardo, og. clt., p. 133.
18
not called in opposition to the Industrial Relations Act, but were incident
to nation-wide disputes. Both the national and local strikes resulted in
litigation which tested the validity and constitutionality of the Kansas
Industrial Relations Act of 1920 and the whole concept of compulsory
arbitration.
In all proceedings before the Kansas Supreme Court, the law was upheld,
but in several rulings the United States Supreme Court drastically curtailed
the power of the Industrial Court. The Kansas Industrial Court Law was
one of the most intensely litigated pieces of American labor legislation
43
prior to the enactment of the National Labor-Relations Act of 1935.
Labor and capital greeted the enactment of the law with a spirit of
hostility. The law became effective on Saturday, January 24, 1920 and on
the following Monday 450 miners struck in protest. The Governor immediately
promised vigorous state action and said the Industrial Court would assist
the local authorities "in a vigorous prosecution under the criminal remedies
44
provided by the law." However, the workers returned to work on their own
accord, declaring that they had not gone to work simply because it was a
45
"blue Monday" and that they did not feel like working,
Dorchy and Howat Cases
The first formal protest by the unions to test the Industrial Court's
43
Earl E. Cummins, The Labor Problem in the United States (New York:
D. Van Nostrand Company, 1932)
, pp. 659-660.
44
New York Times, January 27, 1920.
,
45 »
Hew York Times, January 28, 1920.
19
authority was made on March 20, 1920 by Alexander Howat. In a speech
delivered before the district convention, he said in part:
But come what will and whether or not my bones rot in a
prison cell I am going to fight this law with the force of
12,000 miners in Kansas and regardless of the consequences of
Governor Allen cause to remember that organized labor must
and will have the right to cease work at its will... Be the
consequences what they may, there is no power on earth, iniunc-
tion or otherwise, that will make me call off the strike.^"
The state was prepared to meet Howat' s challenge to defy the Industrial
Court. His threat of a strike failed to materialize. Instead of waiting
for a strike to be called and thus making a t«st case, the state secured
from the district court in Crawford County a temporary order on March 30,
1920 restraining Howat and other union officials from ordering a strike to
47
embarrass the Industrial Court.
The first clash between the Industrial Court and the miners came in
April of 1920. It involved the Court's power of investigation. The Court
undertook to investigate the conditions in the coal mining industry and had
summoned Howat and several other union officials to appear and give testi-
mony. The union officials deliberately refused to acknowledge the court
order. Howat and several union officials were cited for contempt of court.
They pleaded guilty to the charge, but lat«r they changed the plea to not
guilty. Their answer to the accusation was that the Industrial Court was
not a legal entity and therefore had no jurisdiction or authority over the
union or any of its officials. The union officials were found guilty of
contempt of court and fined and sentenced to jail, only to be released
At
Kansas City Star . March 21, 1920.
47
Howat V. Kansas . 258 U. S. 181 (1921).
20
,
.
48
later.
To further insult th« Industrial Court, the injunction against inter-
fering with the operation of the mines was deliberately violated by
Alexander Howat and August Dorchy, the union vice-president. This occurred
when they called the "Mishmash strike" to ostensibly collect back pay which
they thought had accrued to Mishmash, a union mine worker, after he became
elgible for a higher wage scale. According to the Industrial Court's
investigation it was found that the strike was called only to defy the
Industrial Court's injunction and not for the real purpose of imposing a
demand upon the mine owner. The union officials were again cited for
49
contempt of court and committed to jail.
In an appeal to the state Supreme Court, the lower court's decision
was affirmed. It was held that the state's power of investigation and
50
authority over labor and capital was constitutional. The case was taken
to the United States Supreme Court where the decision of the Kansas Supreme
Court was reversed. The United States Supreme Court based its decision on
the Wolff case which shall be discussed later. The United States Supreme
Court decided the Wolff case after the state Supreme Court decided the case
involving Dorchy and Howat. In the Dorchy and riowat case, the question was
whether the penal provisions of the law were separable or whether they fell
as an inseparable part of the system of compulsory arbitration due to the
Wolff decision. The state Supreme Court's decision had affirmed conviction
48
Pittsburg Sun , April 8, 1920.
49
Muggins, 0£. cit., p. 116.
50
State V. Dorchy
. 112 Kansas 235, 210 pac. 352 (1922).
21
before the Federal decision referred to had been rendered. The state's
decision was therefore reversed in order to permit the state Supreme Court
51 'to judge whether or rot the penal provisionii were separable, ,,
When the case was returned, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that
provisions were separable and therefore reaffirmed the lower court's
decision. The Kansas Supreme Court based its decision on Section 28 of
the Act which said: "should any part of this Act be found unconstitutional,
it was to be conclusively presumed that the Act would have passed without
s2 '^ - ' ' ' ;
that section or provision."'
„
'
,..
.
Howat again appealed to the United States Supreme Court where the case
was decided against him. In arriving at its decision, the highest court of
the land side-stepped the constitutionality of a general prohibition of
strikes and confined itself to the particular demands of the strike involved.
The United States Supreme Court held that the strike which had been called
"to collect a stale claim due to a fellow member of the union who was former-
ly employed in the business" was distinctly coercive and that the legis-
lature could make such action punishable as extortion.^ The Court said
that neither the common law nor the 14th Amendment confers to the workers the
absolute right to strike. The Court stated in its decisions
The right to carry on business—be it called liberty or
property—has value. To interfere with this right without
just cause is unlawful. The fact that the injury was inflicted
by a strike is sometimes a justification. But a strike may
be illegal because of its purpose, however orderly the manner
"1
Dorchv V. Kansas
. 264 U. 3. 236 (1923).
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State V. Howat , 116 Kansas 412 (1924).
Dorchv V. Kansas
. 272 U. S. 306 (1926).
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in which it is conducted. To collect a stale claim due to
a member of the union formerly employed in the business is
not 1 permissibl? purpose... .to enforce payment by a strike
is clearly coercion. The legislature may make such action
punishable as extortion or otherwise. ^-'^
The United States Supreme Court in the Dorchy and Howat cases did not
rule that the Act itself was invalid. The Howat case was referred back to
the state court for reexamination in the light of the dociuion that the high
court had made in the Wolff case. In the Dorchv case the Court sidestepped
the constitutionality of the Act and instead based its decision on the
purpose of the strike.
Wolff Ceses
The series of cases which did declare most of the important provisions
of the Industrial Relations Act unconstitutional arose out of a controversy
between the Wolff Packing Company of Topeka, Kansas, and its employees
concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment. A meeting was held
by the workers of this company to vote on the possibility of calling a
strike to secure their demands. Instead of striking the workers decided to
bring their disagreements to the Industrial Court for adjudication.^'^
After a thorough investigation, the Industrial Court prescribed a scale
of wages and hours to be used by the company. The company refused to
observe the new scale. This was the first case outside of the public
utilities in which the Industrial Court attempted to order a change in the
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scale of wages for a business. The Industrial Court initiated mandamus
proceedings to compel the company to obsarve the order. The Wolff Company
refuted the order and contended that the Act deprived it of its property
without due process of the law, that it denied them the equal protection
of the law, and consequently violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. The company argued that the Act compelled it to
operate its business under the conditions imposed, but allowed the worker
the right to quit at any time. Furthermore, the defense contended that
wages of packing-house employees were not so affected with a public interest
as to be subject to state control and regulation and that the employees and
employer were deprived of the freedom to set their own wages. The company
contended that the classification of essential industries under the Act
was unjust and arbitrary.
The contentions of the defense were quickly disposed of. The state
Supreme Court pointed out that the packing company "is not ...compelled to
operate Its plant at a loss, nor is it prohibited from changing its business,
nor from quitting the business if it desires to do either of these things
56
In good faith, not intending thereby to violate any provisions of the Act."
The company argued that their freedom of contract was abridged and that the
Act's classification of industries was unjust and arbitrary. These arguments
were met with the statement that almost every law restricts freedom of
contract to a certain degree, that such restrictions were essential to
enable governments to carry out their intended function, and that the
classification was in fact reasonable and just because the successful
Ibid
. , p. 638.
. ~v.
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operation of the industries included under the Act was essential to the
peace, health, and welfare of all people.
The company claimed that the wages in this industry were not subject
to regulation because this industry was not one affected with public
interest. The Court stated that the legislature had decided that the pack-
ing industry affected the public interest and therefore could be regulated.
The state Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality of the Act
based its decision upon the case of Wilson v. New (1917). This case upheld
the Adamson Act (1916) which regulated the hours of labor on the railways.
The Court stated that both the Adamson Act and the Industrial Court Act were
born of immediate necessity and emergency and saidj
If undpr the commerce clause of the Federal constitution
Congress can regulate wages and hours of labor of those working
on the railroads, the state, under the police power, should
be able to regulate the wages and hours of labor of those work-
ing in a packing plant operating wholly within the state. The
powers of Congress under the commerce clause of the constitution
are no qreater than the authority of the state under the police
power
.
"
The case was again brought before the State Supreme Court and the pack-
ing company attempted to prove that no emergency justifying interference by
the Industrial Court existed. The company also maintained that the portions
of the order that related to changes in working conditions were not valid
because no notice of proposed changes in such conditions had been given to
it. They pointed out that thp plant was operating at a loss and the company
could not afford to grant a wage increase.
The Kansas Supreme Court passed lightly over the company's contentions
and put a very broad interoretation uoon the word "emergency."
^^ Ibid., p. 644.
"^
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The defendant's plant is a small one, and it may be admitted
that, if it should cease to operate, the effect on the supply
of meat and food in this state would not greatly inconvenience
the people of Kansas; yet the plant manufactures food products
and supplies meat to a part of the people of this state, and,
if it should cease to operate, that source of supply would be
cut off.^
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Birch contended that the Industrial
Relations Act was only an emergency measure similar to the Adamson Act and
that the Industrial Court had no right to interfere until there was a clear
danger of a "discomforting shortage" in the supply of the product. He
stated that there was no such danger because there were adequate meat
59
supplies readily available.
In an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, the Wolff Company's conten-
tions were upheld. The underlying assumption of the Act, that the prepara-
tion of food and other essential items were industries clothed with a public
interest, was quickly disposed of. The Court classified only the following
to be clothed with a sufficient public interest to justify some public
regulationi
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a
public grant of privileges which either expressly or implicitly
imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service
demanded by any member of the public. Such are railroads,
other COTimon carriers, and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the
public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest
times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament
or Colonial legislatures for regulating all trades and callings.
Such are those of inns, cabs, and grist mills...
58
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(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception
may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become
subject in consequence to some government regulation. They
have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that
this is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases,
the owner by devoting his business to the public uses, in effect
grants the public an interest in that use and subjects himself
to the public regulation to the extent of that interest although
the property continues to belong to its private owner and to be
entitled to protection accordingly.^^
It was not a matter of mere legislative declaration which could declare
a business to be impressed with a public interest. This was rather a matter
to be determined solely by judicial inquiry, not legislative action. The
Court stated that for a business to be so affected with a public interest,
there must exist "a peculiarly close relationship between the public and
those engaged in that business" and "implications of an affirmative
obligation" by that business "to be reasonable in dealing with the public"
must exist. The judiciary said that a business is not so affected merely
because it "makes commodities for, and sells to, the public in ...common
callings." To reason otherwise would run "the public interest argument
into the ground," and involve a "revolution in the relation of government
to general business." The feature which usually distinguishes a private
from a quasi-public occupation is the right to sell or not to sell goods
on the owner's own will. > .
The United States Supreme Court could find no peculiarly close relation
between the preparation of food by the Wolff Company and the public, no
definite obligation to sell, and no real danger of unreasonable prices
through monopoly. "Given uninterruption in interstate canmerce, the sources
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of the food supply in Kansas are countrywide, a short supply is not likely,
and the danger from local monopolistic control less than ever."
The United States Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide
whether the preparation of food should be classified as a quasi-public
industry. The Court said: "to say that a business is clothed with a public
interest is not to impart that the public may take over its entire manage-
ment and run it at the expense of the owner."
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the Adamson Act and the Industrial
Court Act were similar and based their decision on Wilson v. New . But the
Federal Supreme Court pointed out the following differences between the twoi
"(1) the Adamson Act was passed to meet a national emergency; there was no
such emergency in the case at hand, (2) Congress itself recognized the rail-
way emergency while the Industrial Court, a subordinate body, was empowered
to decide what constituted an emergency situation, (3) the Adamson Act
applied to an industry, the railroads, over which Congress has long had
regulatory powers; no such power has existed before in the case of packing
plants, (4) railroads perform a continuous service to the public; packing
plants do not, and (5) the Adamson Act was required to protect the rights
of the public; the Industrial Court's order to the Wolff Company did not
apply to the general public." They felt that the case of Wilson v. New
"went to the borderline, although it concerned an interstate common carrier
in the presence of a nation wide emergency."
^^ Ibid ., p. 538.
^^ Ibid., p. 538.
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The section of the Kansas Industrial Relations Act which gave the
Industrial Court the power to fix wages in the Wolff Company and in the
whole food industry was declared unconstitutional because it deprived the
employer of his property and the employer and employee of the liberty to
contract without the due process of the law. The Act violated the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court ordered the Kansas Supreme Court to
modify its decision accordingly. But in its opinion, the United States
Supreme Court spoke only of wages. The state of Kansas had dropped the
order concerning conditions of employment because the Wolff Company had not
been notified of this in the Industrial Court's order. In accordance with
the mandate from the United States Supreme Court, the Kansas Supreme Court
ordered the section of its decision concerning wages be striken out, but that
part pertaining to hours be retained. The Industrial Court contended that
the provision for time and one-half for overtime should be retained because
it was a regulation of working conditions and not a wage-fixing provision.
On a rehearing the Kansas Supreme Court allowed this provision and included
65it in its judgment.
,
Both of these decisions were immediately appealed by the Wolff Comp>any
to the United States Supreme Court on grounds of writs of error. The United
States Supreme Court pointed out that the purpose of the Kansas Industrial
Relations Court Act was not to regulate wages and hours generally or in a
particular class of business, but only to authorize the Industrial Court to
fix them in a controversy which threatens the continuity of production. The
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authority granted under the Act was "merely a part of the system of compul-
sory arbitration and to be exerted in attaining its object, which is the
continuity of operation and production." Since the whole system of
compulsory arbitration in the food industry was previously held invalid,
this part was also held invalid. If the regulations concerning hours had
been based on a separate law, concerned with social problems, a different
67
question would have been presented.
A change in the political leadership in Kansas made the Court of
Industrial Relations inactive more than a year before this last decision
was made by the United States Supreme Court. The Industrial Court was
abolished in 1925 by taking away necessary funds for its administration.
The powers of the body were transferred to the Public Service Commission
6R
and later conferred on the Commission of Labor and Industry.
Present Status of Compulsory Arbitration in Kansas
The Act still remains on the law books. No attempt has been made in
recent years to enforce it. Strikes are prohibited in all the industries
orginally named. The constitutionality of that provision remains unchal-
lenged and undetermined. The Commission of Labor and Industry has all the
powers of its predecessors to exercise compulsory arbitration of disputes '
in transportation, mining, and public utilities, and to enforce the law
Oo^Tt of Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Company . 114 Kansas
487 (1923^ ~ —
Gagliardo, o^. cit., p. 193.
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relative to strikes, lockouts, picketing, and boycotts since the courts have
69
not ruled that portion of the Act unconstitutional. It is probable that
the old measure of 1920 will continue to remain dormant unless an industrial
conflict demanding drastic action should again arise, or the type of leader-
ship which first launched the experiment should again gain political control
over the state. However, both of these possiblities appear very unlikely.
»
.,
EVALUATION OF THE ACT •, i
When the Industrial Court was created, its supporters and many other
serious students of labor problems expected far-reaching and beneficial
results from its operations. Their hopes were well expressed in Allen's
message to the legislature which was enumerated in a preceding section.
The Kansas Court of Industrial ReJaticns was designed to carve out a "new
province of law and order" for capital, labor, and the public.
To what extent were these hopes and aspirations of the Industrial
Court realized? Various inherent weaknesses of the Court contributed to
its decline and final death—these being political, economic, and legal.
The Court settled only a few cases. Most of these disputes wtre disposed
of during the first two years of the Court's life. There are a total of
166 dockets listed on the Industrial Court's Order Book. Of this number,
28 were filed in 1920} 125 in 1921; 10 in 1922; 2 in 1923; and 1 in 1924.^^
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This decline, however, seems to coincide to a certain degree with the
general decline of labor disputes in Kansas and elsewhere. The expenses
of the Court continued even though the number of cases declined. It was
inevitable that the taxpayers should complain as they did that such a use-
less agency should be eliminated from the state governmental machinery.
The Industrial Court was very expensive to operate as compared to other
agencies. The operation costs of the Court were $300,218.50 during its five
years of actual existence. This figure represents about twenty-one per cent
of all money spent in administering all labor laws of Kansas for the years
72between 1884 and 1930. If this experiment had been tried in a more
highly industrialized state with more industrial disputes to be settled,
this problem of high costs in operating the Court may not have been so
73
serious.
The Industrial Court became to a great extent a political football.
Various members of the Court were appointed because of their political
beliefs rather than because of their labor relations experience and ability.
Constant meddling of politics so interfered with the work of the Court that
its results do not actually represent a true and fair test of the practi-
cality of the compulsory settlement of labor disputes. However, factors
other than partisan politics delivered the death blow to the Court.
With various changes in court personnel, new and different concepts
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concerning the philosophy, scope, and nature of the Court were introduced.
Because of this, the development of a continuous uniform court policy was
impossible.
Another weakness, more fundamental than the problem of politics, was
the hostility of organized labor and the lack of support by management
for the Court. Desoite the fact that unions and their functions were
explicitly recognized in the Act, the unions were reduced to a state of
Impotency. They were deprived of their most effective weapons—strikes,
boycotts, and nickets. The Act provided for the worker a state agency which
was thought to be more effective and economical than conventional union
tactics in prcxnoting worker interests and settling their problems.
State political leaders and court officials disregarded the traditional
economic forces. The Court not only failed to get the confidence of labor
and its leaders, but it did not attempt to try to do so. There appears to
be little doubt that any scheme for compulsory arbitration or adjudication
to be successful on a large scale must be built on and around organized
labor nnd management. The labor organizations must be of the standard
bona fide business type, organized and operated to a large extent on a
national scale, not of the company or independent type. Failure to recognize
the role of labor was certainly a vital defect in the law which could not be
easily repaired.
Did the Court abolish the need for strikes and therefore eliminate
them during the time it existed? Certainly it did not eliminate their
complete occurrence. Did it reduce their frequency and severity? Opinions
differ as to whether it did or did not. Most of this controversy, however,
centers around the defining of strikes that should be included in determining
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the number of strikes which occurred. The opponents of the Court have
asserted that it fermented strikes rather than diminished them. On the
other hand the supporters and spokesmen of the Court have maintained that
there were considerably fewer strikes and that their length and severity
was actually less during the Court's existence than before its origination
or after its abolishment. Each side's contentions are based on its own
statistics. Therefore, it is rather difficult to come to an objective
conclusion with these differing figures, since each side used its own
definition of a strike to compile its figures to support its own arguments
and position.
However, a more realistic picture of the strikes that did occur in
Kansas can be found by looking at data published by the United States
Department of Labor.
TABLE 1
Number of Labor Disputes Beginning in Specified Areas
from 1919 to 1927a
t t : : i 1 West of t
Year t Kans. t Okla. : Colo. ! Nebr. 1 Mo. t Miss. : U.S.
1919 45 32 31 17 i9 594 3,571
1920 14 24 22 12 m 623 3,291
1921 21 24 Tf 11 &4 569 2,381
1922 4 9 7 3 26 155 1,088
1923 5 2 3 1 » 210 1,553
1924 6 6 5 2 35 163 1,240
1925 12 10 10 2 11 146 1,300
1926 2 2 5 1 9 89 1,032
19Z7 1 3 5 2 14 92 734
a
"Strikes and Lockouts in the United States, 1916 to 1929," Monthly
Labor Review. June. 1930, p. 50.
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These figures include all major work stoppages that resulted from labor
conflicts. The figures show the number of strikes in Kansas, the surround-
ing states, the area west of the Mississippi River, and for the entire
United States during the five years of the Court's existence and also a
year previous plus three years after the Court ceased to exist.
From this table, a general conclusion can be made that the movement of
disputes in Kansas was, in general, the same as in the other areas with
which Kansas is compared. With small differences, the movements were
uniform previous to the Act, during the years of its existence, and during
the years immediately following its dissolution. The number of strikes in
Kansas decreased more rapidly in 1920, the year the Court was inaugurated,
than in the surrounding areas, they increased more rapidly in 1921, and in
1925.
FrcMti these statistics it would appear that the Kansas Court of
Industrial Relations had no appreciable effect on reducing the number of
industrial disputes in Kansas or that it fermented numerous strikes as some
have maintained. However, some strikes and demonstrations did occur in
protest to the Act and the Court, but these were sporadic and relatively
insignificant disturbances. The frequency of strikes was not drastically
affected. The length and outcome of some strikes could have been affected
by the Court's presence.
It was hoped the Industrial Court would stabilize production, returns
to the producer, and prices to the consumer. It was not long before the
Court found that in most cases stability of production, returns, and prices
were dependent upon outside forces over which it had relatively little
control, such as; the weather, the market, and the general attitude of the
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public.
The Industrial Court never confronted a situation similar to the
national coal strike of 1919 which resulted in the enactment of the Court.
Therefore, its ability to insure an adequate supply of such a commodity
during an emergency was never actually tested. Nevertheless, it would
seem reasonable to suppose that if an Industrial Court existed, the
machinery for emergency operations and production could be more easily and
quickly set in motion. By having plans carefully prepared beforehand, such
a body would be able to take over an industry more quickly.
The Industrial Court reviewed and decided only a few wage problems.
The Court was never confronted with any serious and intricate aspects of
wage adjustments. The Wolff case was the most complex of these. And here
the problem was more of a matter of an overall decrease, rather than an
adjustment between existing scales of remuneration. Most increases and
decreases that were made were moderate and usually showed appreciation to
labor's claims. No real systematic set of guidelines were followed in
making wage changes and adjustments. The Court said that it had "no chart
or compass" to follow, but Justice Higgins of the Australian Arbitration
Court had previously formulated some procedures and precedents which were
75
available. The Kansas Court never attempted, it seems, to look to the
experience of other arbitration courts. No doubt the Court's success
suffered greatly from this.
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In reviewing the history of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations,
it can be safely said that it did not bring industrial peace and harmony and
that this experience was to a great extent a complete failure in obtaining
the desired objectives. The death blow was dealt by the United States
Supreme Court in the Wolff cases. However, do the decisions handed down in
the Wolff cases warrant the conclusion that the United States Supreme Court
has ruled against arbitration in general? The Court clearly stated that
compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes in fuel mining and production
and food processing industries was unconstitutional but it ruled in the
Wolff decision that public utilities and common carriers could be regu-
lated. In these areas compulsory arbitration could probably be justified
on the general principle that underlies the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, that of public interest and welfare. Both
77
are public monopolies and of vital importance to the public. In deciding
any future cases involving compulsory arbitration, the main test of consti-
tutionality would probably center around whether the concerned industry was
a business clothed with a sufficient public interest that its interruption
of operations "would leave the public helpless, the whole people ruined, and
all the homes of the land submitted to a danger of the most serious
..78
character.
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states have from time to time attempted to create industrial courts to
arbitrate labor and management differences. The most notable example of
such an experiment was made by the state of Kansas in 1920 following the
serious nation-wide coal strike of 1919. A Court of Industrial Relations
was established to intervene in the event of a threatened interruption of
services in certain declared public interest industries. These industries
were* production or mining of fuel, manufacturing of food and clothing,
transportation, and public utilities. Strikes, lockouts, and picketing
were prohibited. The Industrial Court had the power to fix wages, hours,
and working conditions in the declared essential industries.
The law did not bring industrial peace to Kansas. Strikes continued
to occur. In the coal mining industry union officials challenged the
Industrial Court's authority. Action was taken against the union officials
for violating the strike provisions of the Act. They were convicted for
contempt of court. The Kansas Supreme Court upheld these convictions. In
an appeal to the United States Supreme Court the convictions were again
upheld. The plaintiffs argued that the Act was in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal constitution. The United States Supreme
Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the Act, but based its
decision on the purpose of the strike which was to collect a "stale claim."
It said that a strike may be illegal because of its purposes.
The series of cases which finally resulted in declaring most of the
important provisions of the Industrial Court Act unconstitutional arose out
of a controversy between the Wolff Packing Company of Topeka, Kansas and
its employees. The Industrial Court fixed a new wage and hour scale for
the Wolff Company. The employer challenged the authority of the Industrial
Court to fix wages and hours. The Kansas Supreme Court upheld th« Kansas
Act and the award of the Industrial Court. The case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. It ruled that the Act was unconstitutional.
The Court stated that compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes in fuel
mining and production and food processing industries was unconstitutional
but public utilities and common carriers could be regulated. In these
latter areas compulsory arbitration could probably be justified on the
general principle that underlies the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the constitution, that of public interest and welfare. In
deciding any future cases involving compulsory arbitration, the main test
of constitutionality would probably center around whether the concerned
industry was a business clothed with a sufficient degree of public interest
to justify state interference,
In reviewing the history of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations,
it can be safely said that it did not bring industrial peace and harmony.
Various inherent weaknesses of the Court contributed to its decline and
final death—these being political, economic, and legal. The Court settled
only a few cases. Most of these disputes were disposed of during the first
two years of the Court's life. - .
